Relevance of Track II Diplomacy

1. What is Track II Diplomacy? The concept ‘Track II Diplomacy’ was ‘coined in 1981 by Joseph Montville’ (Jones 2008).

The concept was used to refer to the growing number of unofficial dialogues taking place with respect to conflict resolution. Montville defined Track II Diplomacy as being: …unofficial, informal interaction among members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict (Montville 1992).Similarly, McDonald (1991) defined Track II Diplomacy as ‘unofficial, non-governmental, analytical, policy-oriented, problem-solving efforts by skilled, educated, experienced and informed private citizens interacting with other private citizens. ’ The participants of Track II are usually expected to have access to government officials so that their thinking is not far off track (Kaye 2005).

In this case, the outcomes of Track II can have the prospect to be accepted in the official policy making process (ibid. ).2. How relevant is Track II Diplomacy? The question as to the relevancy of Track II Diplomacy can be answered by examining its rationale.

Track II Diplomacy is resorted to for several reasons; four of which are examined in this essay. It is resorted to when official communication between conflicting parties is ‘tense or non-existent’ (ibid. ). A case in point is the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict which saw no official dialogue between the two parties (Leguey-Feilleux 2009).However, through the use of Track II, an official Georgian-Ossetian negotiation process was established (ibid. .

Track II is also resorted to when official communication between conflicting parties may be controversial (ibid. ). For example, a government may want to open communication with another that it may not have officially recognized, and therefore, any official contact is likely to attract severe criticism, if not disobedience, from its citizenry. In instances like this, governments have used Track II to conceal their actions until circumstances would have changed (ibid.

).Similarly, the resort to Track II makes it possible for governments who are parties to a conflict to indirectly offer to engage in a dialogue without risking political embarrassment (ibid. ). This may, for example, result from one party publicly rejecting the other’s formal (Track I) offer for a dialogue. In contrast, should there be a public rejection of Track II by one government the other will be in the position to deny any involvement (ibid.

). However, if Tack II goes well, then the government can choose to get involve officially (ibid).Finally, when official negotiations remained ineffective, Track II can be and has been a proven resort. This was the experience of the entire world which saw on August 20, 1993, the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel and Palestine. The Oslo Accords were the product of Track IIwhich was resorted to when official negotiations in Washington on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was not bearing fruit (ibid). Therefore, in light of the foregoing, it can be concluded that as long as there is conflict between and among states, Track II will remain very relevant.

Many scholars and practitioners in the field of conflict resolution are also of the view that Track II is very relevant. They have cited several reasons in support of their views. The reasons include but are not limited to, firstly, the existence of many intractable conflicts which tend to involve values that the parties view as critical to their survival, and, as a consequence, are non-negotiable (Azar 1990; Coleman 2000). Noteworthy, whilst traditional negotiation and mediation processes are well suited to resolving resource-based issues, Track II is best suited to resolve issues of identity and survival (Rothman 1997; Kelman 1997).Issues of that nature can only be addressed in a process that works directly to change the underlying human relationship, promoting mutual understanding and acknowledgement of each party’s concerns (ibid.

). Secondly, in intractable conflicts the experience of threat is so powerful that it pervades all aspects of a community’s life (Coleman op. cit. ), and traditional mediation and negotiation by themselves are not enough to address this kind of conflict (Saunders 2001). Conflicts of this sort require a transformation in the conflictual relationship of the parties, a task for which Track II is best suited (ibid).Thirdly and finally, conflict is a dynamic process in which objective and subjective elements interact to create an escalatory, self-perpetuating dynamic (Fisher & Keashly 1991).

Traditional negotiation and mediation approaches are not adequate to address subjective factors (Chigas 2003). They must therefore be supplemented by other (unofficial) processes that address the dynamic of the relationship between the parties and deal with perceptions, distrust, and fears that fuel the escalatory dynamic (ibid. ).