By 1989, Hungary was a leading charge in the fundamental political, social and economic change that would sweep through Eastern Europe, ending the communist Warsaw Pact. Like many revolutions, these movements should have seemed anticipated, but instead caught not only the Soviet Union's leadership by surprise, but the West as well. While the West had its "pull" of consumer culture, the newfound reform policies of Soviet Premier Gorbachev should have been seen as the impetus, or "push" that lead to the 1989 "revolutions. " Gorbachev came to power in 1985 as a known reformist.Nevertheless, his reformation of 1985 was to be one that would improve the communist system, not overthrow it. 1 But his motives would be a key "push" onto not only the Soviet Union, but to its East European satellites as well.

Gorbachev called for a new openness, or glasnost. Glasnost was to eliminate strict censorship, a tenant of the Soviets for decades. 2 This was essentially official permission to discuss issues and have access to information. Gorbachev had led the effort for glasnost, but it took the Chernobyl disaster to see it forward.

This new openness allowed Hungary and other Eastern European countries to reexamine its past, open its press, have publicly differing opinions. This new openness "pushed" Hungary to more open debates and eventually the formation of no less than a half dozen political parties challenging the old order by the end of 1990. 3 While Gorbachev was pushing the communist nations with glasnost, the West was continuing to "pull" from Europe. The British Broadcasting Company (BBC), Radio Liberty (RL) and Radio Free Europe (RFE) had been broadcasting to Eastern Europe since the 1950s.These radio broadcasts to the communist world espoused stability based on democratic ideals and free-market economies.

4 This "pull" was generally blocked through jamming in a number of countries, until the inception of glasnost (1985), but not in Hungary. The people were told that the foundation of these democratic ideals was the conviction of a well-informed electorate. These broadcasts "pulled" at the heartstrings of listeners by providing what the communists would not allow - objective news, discussion of regional issues, and the disparity in quality of life of East versus West.Several researchers have concluded the strong, steady voice of radio programs targeting the Soviet bloc was responsible for the West's triumph in the Cold War. 5 While the case can be made for the communist economic decay as the main cause for the fall of communism, there is considerable evidence that stations like RFE and RL kept the pressure on the Communist leaders and kept hope alive for millions who longed to hear political opinions from outside the media of the one-party state.

Perhaps this effectiveness helped influence Gorbachev's "push" for glasnost. While some East Europeans were blocked from RFE and RL, western television and radio, with rock and jazz music as well as consumer-directed advertising were continually "pulling" those living in communist countries toward democratic principles. Nevertheless, glasnost was only the first step. The socialist-led command economies in Eastern Europe had suffered along with the Soviet Union.Hungary was actually one of the more advanced, economically, of the Warsaw Pact nations, with ONLY 25 percent of the population living in poverty.

7 As Gorbachev struggled with trying to improve the slugging command economies, he determined that it could not be done without radical restructuring (perestroika). The "push" of perestroika focused on management and the inefficiency that were so common in the industrial sectors. Local factories gained more power in their decision making process as planning was decentralized.This led to modest features of free enterprise - product prices would rise as production costs rose. The reserved economic reforms in Hungary failed to overcome the command economy initially, but more-open debates were held and eventually the "pull" from the West helped shape financial policies and increase Hungary's credit worthiness.

As early as the 1970s, Moscow had encouraged East European countries to look to Western Europe and the US for investment and technological assistance.They strategy ultimately failed, but did produce new relationships between the communist enterprise elite and western business. Worsening growth weakened the ideological appeal of old economic models and the government and entrepreneurs alike became less effective instruments of ruling class unification. Hungary moved towards marketization policies through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) backing. 8 While the "push" from Moscow led to mounting debts and declining exports, intra-Bloc trade did increase.This in turn, led to a louder and louder cry from regime spokespersons promoting the virtues of "the market" (a reference to the West).

The biggest "push" for Hungary's transformation came from within. Gorbachev's new policies led to extreme reforms in Poland before Hungary and the "pull" from the West supplanted communist principles with democratic ideals, however it was the inevitability of the spirit of Hungarians that brought about historic changes through peaceful means.It became clear that Gorbachev would not support coercion by the geriatric leaders of the Eastern bloc countries and he would not use force to hold the bloc together as his predecessors had done in Hungary in 1956. 9 Perhaps this hardest "push" came against the greatest symbol of communism; the taking down of "Wall" (electric fence) along its border with Austria. This permitted thousands of East German "vacationers" to slip across the border through for automatic citizenship to West Germany.

Significant numbers of people were beginning to "vote with their feet. "