Terrorist’s activities can all be suppress when government partakes in the scene and ensure the absence of encouragement and resources in any form. The existence of terrorist prolongs because of the fact that thy have direct contacts to necessary resources like hideouts, guns, ammunitions and money.The said materials were provided by supporters which makes terrorism more possible to happen. Terrorist groups are also given access to vital information about their target and can disguise themselves without being caught.

Going in and out of the country is also possible for terrorist because of their connections to authorities.They cling on to moral supports given by other people to sustain the morale of their present members and the willingness of others to be one of them.AnalysisOne of the major sources of support of terrorists is a foreign state. There are certain policies made to discourage this such as the Antiterrorism Act of 1996.

It is now a federal crime for any U.S. citizen knowingly to engage in a financial transaction with a country that has been designated as supporting international terrorism by the secretary of state.The treasury secretary must oppose a loan to any state from any of the major international financial institutions.

The president has the supreme power given by the constitution for him/her to deny country who seeks assistance if the said country is guilty of conniving with terrorist groups.Any form of help to make terrorism possible is strictly prohibited specifically if the said aid is in the form of exportation or selling of ammunitions or any reinforcement materials. On the other hand, giving assistance is allowed only for foreign countries who request for assistance in countering terrorism.Certain steps central to the Antiterrorism Act of 1996—both in its prohibitions of support of foreign terrorist organizations and in its effort to prevent foreign terrorists from entering or remaining in the United States—require an administrative determination that particular foreign organizations are terrorist.They therefore raise two questions of political liberty.

  First, they apply to organizations which may have legitimate purposes, as long as they also have illegitimate, terrorist purposes. Still, it is not too much to ask of an organization seeking support for its non-violent activities that it abandons violence as a condition of receiving that support. Nor is it too much to ask of a supporter of legitimate activities that he find an organization prepared to further these activities without also using violence.The second problem is potentially more serious. It is a dangerous step to prohibit a political organization from receiving support simply on the determination that it is a terrorist organization by a cabinet official whose factual determinations can be overturned by a court only if they are “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion”.

That the law applies only to foreign organizations reduces significantly the danger to our domestic liberties, yet in an increasingly international world, foreign organizations play an increasing part in our politics as well. In earlier years, the African National Congress (ANC) of Nelson Mandela would have been subject to such prohibitions if the secretary of state had said so; even now, the law could apply to the political arms of the Irish Republican Army, depending very largely on the discretion of a cabinet officer reversible only if his judgment is arbitrary.Conclusions with further remarksGenerally, examinations of terrorism from these two perspectives have focused on two issues: 1) the causes of terrorism and 2) a government’s response to terrorism. Regarding the first issue, authoritative examinations of the causes of terrorism from either a consensus or conflict perspective have been rare.While consensus theorists have hinted that terrorism reflects the revolutionary's inability to adapt to the strains of a society experiencing disjunction between cultural goals and means to achieve[i], conflict theorists have suggested that terrorism indicates excessive frustration over the speed with which social change is progressing.[ii]Although a discussion of the causes of terrorism from both of these approaches is warranted (in fact, badly needed), our purpose is an examination of the second issue—the polity's response to terrorism.Consequently, while passing reference may be made to causative factors (indeed, governmental response and the labeling of terrorism may be viewed as causative), this work is most concerned with the manner in which conflict and consensus theories might interpret and predict governmental reactions to terroristic violence.