What was the effect of the ending British Mandate on Palestine?

During 1948 year, the Middle East and especially the people of Palestine was the year where British Mandate for Palestine come to an end, a Jewish state called Israel proclaim independence by the United States as a member of UN. Many people of Arab Palestinians became fugitives, and Israeli forces was encountered with regular armed forces of Iraq, Egypt, Syria and other Arab countries that attached Israel, launching the Arab-Israeli war. Thus, how begun the first war between Arab-Israeli in 1948.

Relations between Israel and neighboring Arab states were far from neighborly. In November 1947 UN resolution, which proclaimed the creation of two state entities on the territory of ancient Palestine – Jews and Palestinian – Arabs, was not supported none of the parties. Bloody war of 1948-1949 years, led to the annexation by Israel of about seven thousand square kilometers of land allotted to the Arabs. About nine thousand Arabs turned overnight refugees, forced to take refuge in neighboring Arab countries.

Poorly concealed sense of the Arabs to the Jewish state can easily be turned into an occasion for an open confrontation. Palestinian refugees have been full of anti-Jewish sentiments. On them camps create a variety of organizations, the perpetrators of sabotage inside Israel. For the latter, it was no secret that these organizations have enjoyed the support of Arab states. There were no incentives or, indeed, benefits for Arab-Israeli recognition and acceptance of each other. The lack of stateness did not provide leaders and diplomats with sufficient security and stability to pursue peace. In short, the so-called ripe moment had not come.

Beside this war, there is six day war in 1967, which was the third Arab-Israeli in less than twenty years. It was war that took many in the international community by surprise, a confrontation that neither Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan, nor the United States and the Soviet Union claim to have wanted. The six day war was the result of political development, which began with the change of government in Syria in 1966, when already bad Syrian-Israeli border relations were deteriorating. On 5 June 1967 Israel launched its preemptive strike. The Israeli air-force destroyed Egyptian, Syrian and Jordan aircraft, mostly on the ground. The war left Israel in control of Jordan’s West Bank, Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, and Syria’s Golan Heights. Israel’s air superiority was the most important factor in Israel’s victory, followed closely by the lack of Arab coordination which enabled Israel to deal separately with Egypt, Jordan and Syria rather than having to fight a genuine three-frontal war (Kirsten E. Schulze, 2008). By June, Syria, Jordan and Egypt had agreed to cease-fires. As in 1948, this war proved decisive in its consequences, both increasing Israel’s territory and tilting the strategic balance unequally in Israel’s favour.

The next conflict between those countries was in 1973 called Yom Kippur war (October war), where Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. The war came as a surprise to Israel while all people iclud military were praying and fasting at home. Israel had underestimated the frustration of the Arab government over Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights, Sinai, West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Politically, the Arab had won the war. Egyptian confidence had grown dramatically as a result of the war. From an Egyptian perspective, Israel had only been saved by the United States. Despite the Israeli victory, confidence had been seriously shaken, resuling in public anger directed at Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, and leading to a full investigation of the intelligence failure under the Agranat Commission. The Commision’s report was highly critical of military intelligence, discipline and training, but failed to adress the responsibility of political leaders for Israel’s losses. The 1973 October war has proved a particularly difficult conflict. Renewed military confrontation made it clear, on the one hand, that Egypt could not defeat Israel despite the elements of surprise and acquisition of Soviet arms, and, on the other hand, that Israel, despite being victorious in all Arab-Israeli wars, was not protected from Arab attacks. The termination of President Anwar Sadat and the willingness of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to take the risk of peace made successful Israeli-Egyptian negotiations possible.

In 1978, The Camp David Accords wew signed betwee Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, and Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, in Maryland at Camp David along with Us President Jimmy Carter as a witness. The Camp David Accords first began ehwn President Sadat took a trip to Jerusalem to discuss the topic of peace between Egypt and Israel with Prime Minister Begin. This visit started talks between the two countries and had them developing peace negotiation. In the midst of creating peace, there was a period where nothing else was being done. Since there was a deadlock, President Carter invited both Sadat and Begin to Camp David to work out a permanent peace agreement. The Camp David Accords were signed in September, 1978. In March 1979, the peace treaty, better known as the Egyptian Israeli Peace Pact, was completely finished.

The Egyptian Israeli Peace Pact was signed in 1979 in Washington. The treaty has a military annex, an annex dealing with the relation between the parties, agreed minutes interpreting the main articles of the article, the withdrawal schedule, exchange of ambassadors, security arrangements, and the agreement relating to the autonomy talk. The point of the treaty was to, not only create peace between Israel and Egypt, but also between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The desired result of the treaty was to bring the war atmosphere to an end, and to establish peace where everyone can live safely (RosenWasser, pg.36). The treaty asks that Israel withdraws from Arab lands, under thr circumstances that the Arab population accepts the existence of Israel. Egypt and Israel were almost positive that the treaty would resolve all of their problems relating to order.

However, there has been a failure to find a peace agreement between Israel and Syria. The opportunity for peace between Syria and Israel is real. The two countries have come close to an agreement twice before, through U.S.- mediated talks in 1995–1996 and again in 1999–2000. Recently Israel and Syria have been conducting indirect peace negotiations under Turkish auspices. However, they have both expressed a need for U.S. mediation to carry the talks to the next level. Although there is no guarantee of success, the benefits of a Syria-Israel peace deal would be remarkable, not only for the two countries themselves, but also for the Lebanese, Iraqis, as well as countries that are interested in containing Iran’s influence in the region. A deal between Syria and Israel would also help revive the Arab peace initiative, which was launched in 2002 and proposed a broad normalization of relations between Israel and member states of the Arab League. These outcomes would be very much in the interest of the United States. The Obama administration should recognize that Syrian-Israeli peace could provide an important breakthrough in the Middle East and should there- fore develop an integrated approach to help make peace between Israel and Syria possible.