Good Essay Example about Japanese Internment

The decision to imprison Japanese Americans was a popular one in 1942. It was supported not only by the government, but it was also called for by the press and the people. In the wake of the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, Japan was the enemy. Many Americans believed that people of Japanese Ancestry were potential spies and saboteurs, intent on helping their mother country to win World War II.

"The Japanese race is an enemy race," General John DeWitt, head of the Western Defense Command wrote in February 1942. "And while many second and third generation Japanese born in the United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become Americanized,' the racial strains are undiluted" (quoted in Smith, 1995: 83).
On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Executive Order 9066. The Order declared that "the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national defense material, national defense premises, and national defense utilities." In pursuit of this goal, the Secretary of War, or the military commander whom he might designate, was authorized "to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as hemay determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretaryor the Military Commander may impose in his discretion.

" The Secretary was also authorized "to provide for residents of any such areas who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessaryuntil other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order" (see Appendix 1).
Though the Order seems to be in violation of the Constitution at the time, the Supreme Court upheld it because of "military necessity." "There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some [Japanese Americans], the military authorities considered that the need for action was great, and time was short. We cannot - by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight - now say that at that time these actions were unjustified," stated Justice Hugo Black on December 18, 1944 (quoted in Irons, 1989: 83).
The War Department oversaw the removal of people of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast based upon wartime military necessity.

Shortly after the passage of Executive Order 9066, General DeWitt issued Public Proclamation 1, which created Military Areas 1 and 2. Military Area 1 covered the western portion of Washington, Oregon, California, and the southern half of Arizona. Military Area 2 consisted of portions of all those states that were not in Area 1. In these areas, all enemy aliens included Japanese, German, and Italian aliens as well as American citizens of Japanese decent. The government moved to take full control of an evacuation and relocation program.

The Wartime Civil Control Authority (WCCA) was created as a part of the Western Defense Command to oversee the evacuation and relocation program. From the very beginning, the evacuation and relation program was orchestrated by the military to justify their need for national security. Although all enemy aliens were said to be suspect, it was the Japanese, both alien and citizen, who were singled out for removal (Ng, 2002: 21-22).Among the Japanese American community, DeWitt's announcement was met with disbelief. The orders were seen as a betrayal and a violation of rights, particularly by the Nisei, second generation Japanese Americans.

They had been model citizens and had given the government no reason to believe that they would take part in sabotage or undercover activities, the injustice of the situation infuriating. Saburo Kido, the president of the JACL, stated, "Never in the thousands of years of human history has a group of citizens been branded on so wholesale a scale as being treacherous to the land in which they live. We question the motives and patriotism of men and leaders who intentionally fan racial animosity and hatred" (quoted in Thomas and Nishimoto, 1946: 27).
Veterans of World War I, such as Joe Kurihara, were especially outraged since they had already proven their loyalty by fighting for their country. "Having had absolute confidence in Democracy, I could not believe my very eyesAmerica, the standard bearer of Democracy, had committed the most heinous crime in its history.

" And when Secretary of War Stimson made an attempt to justify Roosevelt's actions by citing not only military necessity but also concerns for the safety of the Japanese American community, many Nisei scoffed. "The government could have easily declared Martial Law to protect us," Kurihara pointed out (quoted in Yancey, 2001: 35).Despite their outrage, few Japanese Americans actively resisted. Although some protested, signed petitions, and attended meetings, these groups were not well organized and had little power to resist a presidential decree.By June 1942 residents were being transferred into permanent WRA relocation centers throughout the West. Everyone was relieved to find that these camps were not brutal concentration camps like those established by the Nazis in Europe, but they were prisons nevertheless - stark, restrictive, and uncomfortable.

Living conditions were generally better in the camps than in the assembly centers. Buildings were new, and there were more space on the grounds so residents could get away from their ever-present neighbors. Nevertheless, conditions were still difficult and frustrating. Bathrooms, laundries, and dining halls were communal.

Barracks were hot in summer and cold in winter. Space was at a premium; most apartments were about twenty feet by twenty feet square. Each was heated by a small oil-burning stove, and none had running water. The only furniture provided was a bed and two blankets per person. Residents were shown a pile of straw and had to stuff their own mattress ticking before they could sleep. Residents were used to such challenges by now, however.

As one WRA report stated, "The great majority of center residents were psychologically bruised, badly puzzled and frequently apathetic group of people. But during their stay at the centers theytried to achieve some semblance of order and dignity in their broken lives" (quoted in Yancey, 2001:50-51).Although negative attitudes remained, a greater number of people worked for increased tolerance and acceptance. Two of the most influential men to speak out on behalf of Japanese Americans were Dillon Myer and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes. In March 1943 Mayer wrote to Secretary of War Stimson recommending that the order that kept the Japanese off the West Coast be relaxed. "After many months of operating relocation centers, the War Relocation Authority is convinced that they were undesirable institutions and should be removed from the American scene as soon as possible [Internment] has added weight to the contention of the enemy thatthis nation preaches democracy and practices racial discrimination" (quoted in Yancey, 2001:74-75).

On December 17, 1944, Roosevelt listened while the head of the Western Defense Command made the announcement, "Whereas, The present military situation makes possiblethe termination of the system of mass exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestryI H. C. Pratt, Major General, U.S. Army, by virtue of the authority vested in me asCommanding General, Western Defense Command do hereby declare and proclaim that, effective January 2, 1945Civilian Exclusion Ordersare rescinded" (quoted in Yancey, 2001:81-82).

The exclusion order was officially lifted on the second day of the New Year. Suddenly Japanese Americans were free to go anywhere they chose. Ironically, many found that after three years of imprisonment, freedom was too frightening to contemplate.During World War II the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of interning American citizens of Japanese ancestry in what has been called "the darkest hour in the Court's history.

" In 1980, Congress, pressured by the Japanese American Citizens League, established the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians to investigate the events that led to Executive Order 9066. It concluded that there was no legal or moral basis of Japanese internment and that the evacuation was caused by "race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership" (quoted in Stanley, 1994: 87). Unlike the victim of European concentration camps, not one person was compensated for loss of freedom, the death of relatives, illness, or mental suffering. Claims were paid solely on property losses. The report recommended a payment of $20,000 to each internee and that the government apologizes for the illegal act. Congress accepted the recommendations and the government ultimately paid $38,474,140 in property claims to Japanese Americans.

This was less than 10 percent of their value in 1942.Though the Executive Order 9066 may have been legally right at the time, it was morally wrong. According to the government, the interment of Japanese Americans was justified as a "military necessity". However, after the war, the United States Supreme Court found it to be legally and morally wrong. It concluded that there was no legal or moral basis of Japanese internment and that the evacuation was caused by "race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership" (quoted in Stanley, 1994: 87).

Appendix 1
EXECUTIVE ORDER 9066
February 19, 1942
AUTHORIZING THE SECRETARY OF WAR TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY AREAS
WHEREAS the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities as defined in Section 4, Act of April 20, 1918, 40 Stat. 533, as amended by the Act of November 30, 1940, 54 Stat. 1220, and the Act of August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 655 (U. S.

C., Title 50, Sec. 104):
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgment of the Secretary of War or the said Military Commander, and until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order. The designation of military areas in any region or locality shall supersede designations of prohibited and restricted areas by the Attorney General under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, and shall supersede the responsibility and authority of the Attorney General under the said Proclamations in respect of such prohibited and restricted areas.

I hereby further authorize and direct the Secretary of War and the said Military Commanders to take such other steps as he or the appropriate Military Commander may deem advisable to enforce compliance with the restrictions applicable to each Military area hereinabove authorized to be designated, including the use of Federal troops and other Federal Agencies, with authority to accept assistance of state and local agencies.I hereby further authorize and direct all Executive Departments, independent establishments and other Federal Agencies, to assist the Secretary of War or the said Military Commanders in carrying out this Executive Order, including the furnishing of medical aid, hospitalization, food, clothing, transportation, use of land, shelter, and other supplies, equipment, utilities, facilities, and services. This order shall not be construed as modifying or limiting in any way the authority heretofore granted under Executive Order No. 8972, dated December 12, 1941, nor shall it be construed as limiting or modifying the duty and responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with respect to the investigation of alleged acts of sabotage or the duty and responsibility of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, prescribing regulations for the conduct and control of alien enemies, except as such duty and responsibility is superseded by the designation of military areas hereunder.

THE WHITE HOUSE, Franklin D. Roosevelt, February 19, 1942.
Works Cited
Davis, Daniel S. Behind Barbed Wire. New York, NY: E. P.

Dutton, Inc., 1982.Girdner and Loftis, The Great Betrayal, 148.Irons, Peter, ed.

, Justice Delayed: The Record of the Japanese American Internment Cases. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989, 83.Ng, Wendy. Japanese American Internment during World War II: A History and Refernce Guide.

Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002.Smith, Page. Democracy on Trial. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995, 124.Stanley, Jerry. I Am An American: A True Story of Japanese Interment.

New York, NY: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1994.tenBroek, Jacobus, Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd W. Matson. Prejudice, War, and the Constitution.

Berkeley and Lost Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1954.Thomas, Dorothy Swaine, and Richard S. Nishimoto. The Spoilage. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1946, 27.Yancey, Diane.

The Internment of the Japanese. San Diego, CA: Lucent Books, 2001.