What was the significance of lend-lease materials for the war on the Eastern Front 1941-1945

During the War on the Eastern Front 1941-1945, the Soviet Union received all kinds of material from the USA, the Great Britain (Commonwealth) and Canada that aided the soviet military effort against Germany. This was called "lend-lease". The aim of this investigation is to find out what impact lend-lease had on the war on the Eastern Front. The investigation will include a comparison between the amount of soviet production of material used before and during the war with the amount of lend lease material brought there, a comparison between the quality of Soviet products and lend-lease products used in the war and the findings will then be analysed.B.

Summary of evidenceThe lend lease aid was shipped in convoys to Archangelsk and Murmansk in northern Russia, Vladivostok in the Far East and through Persia1.1. The type and quantity of lend-lease products brought to the Soviet UnionA total of 1.8 million tons of lend-lease shipments arrived to Russia in 1941-19422. In 1943-1944 the aid was stepped up and an estimated 7 million tons arrived in those years3.

Table 1 (pg. 8) shows the quantity of military products that were sent to Russia by lend-lease.Table 2 (pg. 8) shows some civilian material sent to Russia by lend-lease.2. The type and quantity of material produced in the Soviet UnionTable 3 (pg.

8) shows the quantity of some military articles produced by the Soviet Union 1941-1945.Table 4 (pg. 9) shows the quantity of some military articles produced by the Soviet Union in the pre-war years of 1939-1941.The total quantity of key articles in the Soviet military (1941-1945) is therefore: Tanks: 116100. Artillery: 590999 guns.

Combat aircraft: 135755 planes.Table 5 shows some other, civil commodities produced by the Soviet Union 1941-1945.The figures for the Soviet food production are uncertain but it is known that the Germans had captured 42% of the Soviet agricultural areas in 1942 and that they by 1943 still possessed around 37%4.4. Qualitative comparison: Lend-lease products to Soviet counterpartsCivil articles will not be compared in this way (assuming that the significance of raw materials is based on quantity, not quality), so this only concerns military articles.

a) TanksMost of the lend-lease tanks were light and could not match German tanks5.2 007 of the lend-lease tanks were the much better Sherman M4:s6. These tanks were almost as good as the T-34:s7, the bulk of the Soviet tank potency.b) AircraftThe most commonly sent aircraft were the P-39, the P-40, the P-63 fighters and the A-20 bomber8.

These were "very highly appreciated"9 by the Soviet airforce, which found them better than most of their own models.5. An assessment of the situation on the Eastern Front 1941-19451941-1942In 1941 the Germans enjoyed a tremendous military superiority and by the end ofthe year they had occupied Ukraine and had reached the outskirts of Moscow and Leningrad. The USSR lost enormous amounts of both civil and military materials in these first months of war and industrial production was severely lowered; totally by as much as 50%10. However, much of the industry was 'moved' to the east, and production started to recover in 1942, but it suffered from lack of raw materials and manpower11.The German advance was stopped at the end of 1941 particularly with the use of Siberian reinforcements12.

A fresh German assault in the summer of 1942 extended the southern frontline to Stalingrad.1943-1945"The Red Army of 1943 was very unlike the Red Army of 1941 or even 1942"13 both in terms of equipment, morale and leadership. The Soviet victories at Stalingrad and Kursk marked the 'turn of tide' in the war on the Eastern Front14. After these battles the Russians pushed the front westwards and invaded Germany in 1945 and victory was claimed later that year.C. Evaluation of sources1.

"Lend Lease to Russia", from Major Jordan' Diaries, NY, Harcourt, Brace, 1952, Chapter Nine.This is a 26-paged document describing the type, quantity and cost (in US dollars) of all US material sent to the Soviet Union during the Second World War. It was written during the Korean War and when the US introduced harsher policies against Communism.The purpose of the document is mostly professional; it was major Jordan's job and interest to find out exactly what products had been sent to Russia. Major Jordan also wanted to prove that some goods had been sent illegally under the terms of the lend lease act which prohibited "goods furnished for relief and rehabilitation purposes."This report is the sole source on this part of lend lease since the U.

S. government never released a detailed description on the subject. Therefore, this report is extremely valuable: Historians have used it as a reference to their analysis on lend lease.It is, however, quite limited. Even though much data has been based on Soviet records, (Russian agents in the US going through the equipment before shipment) it is a "one man project" which could be biased.

Also, it is well known that not all materials sent safely arrived to Russia.2. Zhukov, G.K.

, Vospominanija I Razmysjlenija ("Memories and thoughts"), vol 1, 1974This is field marshal Zhukov's memoirs. It is written in 1974, when the d�tente in the Cold War was developing.The purpose is probably highly personal: He describes his own opinion and thinking and one can sense a highly patriotic and anti-fascist tone.The value of Zhukov's memoirs lies in that it shows a Soviet field-marshal's thinking at the time of the war.

It also gives much detail on the state of the whole Soviet high command, especially on Stalin.Nevertheless, this is a limited source. Most importantly it should not be taken for granted that the numerical figures and beliefs of Zhukov are true. This is a "one man project" aswell. It is also interesting that there is no mention, at all, of lend lease products imported to Russia.D.

AnalysisSome information in Section B is missing or is uncertain due to lacking information and assumed favouritism. Until recently the subject of lend-lease has been highly secretive or biased due to the Cold War, and there are still significant differences between US and Soviet sources. This limitation of the investigation must be taken into account before making an analysis. Most tables in the appendix have been constructed on a mixture of sources to minimise error.

To begin with one should understand that 1941-1942 and 1943-1945 were two quite different periods in the war on the Eastern Front (see Section B). 1941 was "l'an�e terrible15"for USSR and many anticipated its defeat. It is hence arguable that lend-lease aid was needed more than ever for USSR this year. Lend-lease had though, hardly even started in 1941 and by 1942 a stumpy total of 1.

8 millions tons of materials had arrived. Many of the early lend-lease materials were also "unsatisfactory16"; for example the light tanks. In 1943 the lend-lease had gained a much more serious role not only because of the increased quantity it made up for, but also for the improved quality of products. But the aid was probably not needed as much in 1943 onwards, both due to Soviet military successes and by increased American, British and Canadian military involvement in the war.

Lend-lease might have supported USSR in these general ways: The industry; the military; the food-issue; psychologically. These topics will here be separately analysed although they are quite related.The industry. Generally speaking, the lend-lease accelerated the soviet industry's transformation to a war footing17.

Before the war, many Soviet factories produced civil items such as tractors, trucks, locomotives, railway carts and raw materials. When the war came most of those factories were set to produce combat materials instead. This does not mean, though, that civil materials were not needed anymore. Quite the opposite actually, transportation for example, was needed more than ever for supplies etc18.

The lend-lease brought 429687 motor vehicles, 1981 locomotives,11155 railway carts and masses of raw materials. Without this essential reinforcement the Soviet industry would have had to concentrate more on civil production e.g. raw materials and transportation vehicles.

Consequently, the war industry would not be able to develop as fast as it did. This is important because some historians claim that it was, in fact, the size of the Soviet war industry that decided the outcome of the Eastern Front conflict19.The military. Concerning pure military products, lend-lease had a smaller significance to USSR.

From information in Section B one can calculate that only 8% of all Soviet tanks were provided by lend-lease and that they were all inferior to the mass-produced T-34. 16% of the aircraft is a more significant amount, since the quality was mostly better here, but evidence shows that most planes, as well as the better tank models were only seen in the Red Army by 194320. One should also include the enormous Soviet production of artillery guns21; it strengthens the impression that lend-lease war-items were insignificant.The counter argument is that the Soviet military was more dependent on civil lend-lease materials22. The most important civil contribution were the motor vehicles: With these, the Red Army could perform operations requiring speed and mobility23. 15 million boots and millions of meters of uniform cloth helped to equip the Red Army.

Lend-lease also helped to improve the Soviet military communications24.The food issue. That the Germans had occupied 42% of the Russian agriculture by 1942 was an increasing problem to the Soviet leadership25. Without lend-lease, which sent 4.5 millions of tons of food 1941-1945 there might have been severe food shortages leading to starvation. This in its turn could have led to public discontent.

The Red Army was also strengthened by increased food-ratios26.