Definitions of Fordism are varied, numerous and at times conflicting. This essay discusses which features are pertinent to and uniquely defining of Fordism rather than Taylorism, Sloanism, Toyotism or any other socio-economic policy with which it may have become intertwined. While many of these -isms share characteristics, this essay will try to distinguish which were distinctly Fordist and how they shaped the revolution in terms of management and organisation and ultimately society.
Also discussed will be some of the limitations of Ford’s practices, which at times were just as necessary as the successes in inspiring revolution. Meticulous and innovative organisation are what first propelled the Ford Motor company to success. In this regard it is principally characterised by fragmentation of tasks, specialisation of tools, mass production, and vertical integration. ‘Mass production’ a term coined by Henry Ford himself, was the principal force behind the firm’s early success, marking a radical departure from traditional craft manufacture.
In the early 1920’s Ford was producing 2 million identical Model T’s on an annual basis, whereas Panhard et Lavassor the world’s leading car manufacturer in 1984 could muster at best one thousand heterogeneous cars a year (Womack 1990). The main way that Ford achieved this astonishing level of production in comparison to his rivals was by deconstructing the production process into simple, individual and easy tasks. There are obvious symmetries with Taylorism here, whereby Frederick Taylor famously broke down work into individual tasks and timed how long it took to complete each one.From here he worked out the maximum output a worker could achieve in a day, and set incentives for going above and disincentives for falling below this output.
Ford too achieved great success by degrading and decomposing work into small and simple tasks. Despite having a Works-study department dedicated to calculating how long each task should take (Beynon 1984), Ford and his chief subordinates denied copying Taylor (Petersen 1967). Work-time study was a common managerial practice of the age.Where Taylor decomposed the tasks to improve efficiency of the individual, Ford welded the individual labours together to increase output of the firm (Clarke 1990). Petersen (1967) clarifies the difference by saying that Ford exerted control through the machine, whereas Taylor exerted it directly through the person, adding that Ford had no desire to improve people, presumably because the tasks were deliberately so simple.
Beynon (1984) adds to this stating that the managers at Ford were only interested in producing the maximum number of cars that the plant could produce not the maximum the individual could produce as Taylor did.Prior to Fordism, cars were built by skilled mechanics using a few tools for a number of jobs, and notably carrying out the laborious and time consuming task of filing and ‘fitting’ heterogeneous parts so that they attached properly (Womack 1990). Ford removed the skill and time requirements of this process by insisting on absolute standardisation of all gauges, components and tools, so that each part fitted every time, without the need for skilled fitting.Further to this, he made it so that there was only one tool per task, so that the worker only needed to know how to use the tool in one specific way, dramatically reducing requirements on experience. Fuchs (2002), although not present at the time, says that even immigrants with little to no command of the English language required only “a few minutes” of training to master their work station, as opposed to the decades required to master craft production. Relatively recently, US chemical firms have found themselves caught short by an under-skilled workforce.
In a study completed in 1999 Besson states that 71% of the companies surveyed had resorted to “restructuring job descriptions and tasks”, i. e. fragmenting the work process, as Ford did. By emulating Ford, these firms no longer needed skilled employees and stayed profitable. The reasons behind taking up Fordism may be different, but the benevolent effects of Fordism are still relevant and present today. The key to Ford’s revolution does not lie in him producing the same car over and over again, but having standardised and interchangeable parts that were all precisely identical to each other (Clarke 1990).
It is very important to note that while the ultra-specialisation of tools and parts in Ford factories propelled production and the success of the Ford Model T, its rigidity was ultimately restrictive. The high, inhibitive cost of altering the specialist tools to make new products, as well as Henry Ford’s insistence not to change anything, meant that Ford lost market share to General Motors in the second quarter of the 20th century by not adapting their final products to market needs (Tolliday & Zeitlin 1986).Alfred Sloan, General Motors’ president recognised the phenomenal powers of Fordist production as well as its limitations, and by being more flexible with the tools was able to bring in new products on a yearly basis to meet changing demands in the market in terms of price, functionality and practicality among other things. So confident in his ability, Ford ceased to trust outside sources and pursued a policy of internalisation and vertical integration (Womack 1990).In 1928 with the construction of the River Rouge Complex and his extensive network of franchises, Ford was able to obsessively control every part of the process of selling cars. This brought reduced costs and problems in that he did not pay outside companies for parts; he produced them efficiently himself and kept to delivery schedules better by avoiding dependency on third parties (Womack 1990).
Using the ‘visible hand’ having rather than leaving it to market forces, Ford actually became inefficient, with ever expanding inventories that outstripped demand (Chandler 1977).At the time, Ford had such dominant market position that he could force dealers to accept superfluous production with threats of withdrawal. This level of integration was neither appropriate nor possible for other car manufacturers, especially in Japan where space was and is at a premium. While Taiichi Ohnio is said to have been heavily influenced by Ford (Petersen 1967), Emiliani and Seymour (2011) view this as more of a formality or out of respect. Stronger is the influence of Kanzler who developed efficient methods of only bringing in the materials required at any one point in the Highland Park factory (Petersen 1967).This crude method of just-in-time management pre-dated Toyotaism, but set the foundations for lean production coupled with an intensification and revamping of Fordist principles such as division of work, definition of roles and short work cycles (Bartezzaghi 1999).
The contribution of Fordism in the revolution of organisational practices was certainly immense, particularly in the automobile industry, but in production processes generally (e. g. the US chemical industry as already mentioned).That said, it is important to remember that many of the practices which Ford employed, the assembly line, degradation of work and vertical integration actually pre-dated Ford. It was his remarkable combination and personal alteration of these concepts though which brought about such monumental success. Managing such a large organisation presented challenges as well as opportunities to Ford.
He dealt with these managerial challenges primarily through innovative control methods, loyalty engendering incentives and strict systems of hierarchy.The assembly line is often credited as Ford’s biggest contribution to production, but the moving line actually predates Ford; Petersen (1967) notes that Oliver Evans used moving lines in his 19th Century windmills. Indeed Ford actually admits to being influenced by the disassembly lines of Chicago slaughterhouses which he visited (Simons and Zokaeik 2005). Ford’s significant contribution was to mechanise it, giving him unprecedented and independent control over the worker’s output. Managers could theoretically now control how much work someone on the shop floor did at the flick of a switch.To a large extent this was true and in just one year labour hours per car produced fell from 12 hours and 8 minutes to 1 hour and 35 minutes (Chandler 1977).
However, obsessed by output the managers sped up the lines to unfeasible speeds; the workers began shirking, i. e. deliberately or otherwise not producing at maximum output. Many workers couldn’t handle the pace and left. Jacoby (1991) claims that in one 12 month period between 1913 and 1914 there was a staff turnover rate of 412%.Tolliday and Zeitlin (1986) say it was slightly lower at 370% but add that of that figure 71% were ‘Five Day Men’.
That is to say, men who stayed for one working week and left without telling the company. What concerned Ford was that while individuals were interchangeable, large groups were not, and the threat of union action in the Ford plant was ever more present from union activists (Jacoby 1991). Incentivising by piece-work as Taylor had done was not an option for Ford, as the worker was no longer in control of how much he produced, he needed workers to want to keep up.His answer was to introduce the $5 day reducing the working day by one hour, and more than doubling the pay for it.
The results were predictable; reportedly 12,000 men queued up in search for a job despite freezing conditions (Jacoby 1991). Also to appeal to the large influx of immigrants Ford offered English and Americanization classes. Ford was not the first to adopt a policy of welfare capitalism. European companies such as Krupp, Le Creusot and Cadbury’s pre-dated Ford in going beyond what was economically required to look after their workforce (Jacoby 1997).What was different about Ford’s welfare capitalism is that it was not altruistic.
He showed to the world that helping employees was good business policy; Ford showed little more than contempt for his employees, famously asking “Why is it when I hire a pair of hands, I I get a human being? ” (Harry et al. 2011). Surrender to supervision was the caveat for such an enticing offer. Employees had to subject themselves to inspections from the much decried Sociological department, prompting one worker to state that “Spies are everywhere. No one is safe.
” (Beynon 1984 p. 144).Despite this, the scheme was very popular, and over 16,000 immigrants graduated from Ford’s school of Americanization, all but brainwashing themselves into becoming Ford’s ideal worker. This is arguably the beginning of organisational culture, introducing an identity of what Ford workers should be, to which the masses duly complied.
This is now seen in more abstract forms, where workers have ‘dress down Fridays’ to encourage the ideal of a relaxed environment (Grey 2005). As every worker started to learn who they should be, they also learnt their place. Ford ensured that every department had a strict hierarchy, Society is affected in numerous ways thanks to the practices of Ford.As a result of mass production, mass consumption became possible, American immigrants in particular found themselves integrated better in society and class divisions were also affected. The production processes and organisation that Ford used was copied the world over, not just by other American firms like General Motors, or European pioneers like Louis Renault or even Japanese firms like the Toyodas.
The philosophy of interchangeable parts, moving assembly lines and specialisation of labour moved into other industries as well including XXXXXXXXXXX.In fact XXXX states that the best assembly lines today use truly interchangeable parts. Even US chemical firms returned to Fordist principals to meet a skill shortage. XXXX said that Fordism was the enemy of sociology, communism etc. However XXX says that this method was favoured by XXXX. Essentially what it comes down to is that Fordism by producing so many XXXX actually inspired demand for them.
Ford was one of the first companies to create demand as well as the product. What this meant for society was that household goods plummeted in price.Suddenly goods were able to achieve ‘household’ status because mass production meant identical versions could be produced. XXXX tells of how after an X hour drive he was sitting in identical fast-food joint to the one he had been in before, and knew “that somehow Ford had a part to play in it all (XXXX).
Despite forming over 50% of his workforce, Henry Ford had a particular dislike of immigrants. However his Americanization classes, in which over 16,000 immigrants graduated helped literally thousands of foreigners integrate into American society as they learnt the language and customs of American people.Jacoby (1991) tells of how an immigrant from Poland totally rejected all notion of being Polish, or even dual nationality, he was just ‘American’. As Ford led the way in managing large organisations, other companies quickly emulated this Fordist practice of encouraging foreigners to learn the American way, albeit often to a lesser extent as English classes would clash with night-shifts for example (XXXXXX). These new levels of integration between different nationalities helped to bond social cohesion in the United States.
However the division of labour actually reinforced class divisions when Ford expanded to Europe (Clarke 1990). While most of the work required no skill level at all, there were required; supervisors, production engineers and skilled repairmen to name a few. Fuchs (2002) points out that there were few career prospects for an assembly worker save that of becoming a foreman thanks to the Fordist hierarchy. This meant that in Europe’s already divided society, those that had skills continued to take advantage, and those that didn’t had little opportunity to develop, bonding tighter the divisions that separated the classes in Europe.
Society in general benefitted from Fordism. Anyone who uses a commercial product today from a car to a standardised pen would be foolish to deny that they have benefitted from the revolution in production for which Fordism is responsible. While it can hardly be stated that Ford was the key to forming America as the ethnic melting pot it is today – he was famously anti-Semitic, writing newspaper articles on the subject – but the policy of helping immigrants to become American certainly eased tensions, and was widely copied by other firms in the US and Europe.Furthermore, by taking mass production to the world, even those at the bottom of society were able to benefit from lower costs. To conclude, Fordism was revolutionary not inventive. Many of the characteristics most closely associated with Fordism, specialisation of work, the moving assembly line, vertical integration, welfare capitalism to name a few were not unique to Ford.
His genius comes in integrating all these ideas to manage the gargantuan projects. Ford’s boldness and utter refusal to trust anyone else won him great credit in the early years. Rigidity and specialisation, other key characteristics of Fordism were essential in out-producing the craft manufacturers.What ultimately held Fordism back as a management and organisational set of principles was that it was too rigid, too specialised and too far centred around Ford. In the end, Fordism was too Fordist to continue as a viable socio-economic policy.
Without Fordism galvanising the production industry, it is hard to tell when Sloanism would take place, or Toyotism or even the study of organisational culture. Where other companies met the demands of the market, the market met the demands of Ford.
