The foreign policy of the United States has often been described as “isolationist”. This dates to the founding fathers of the republic, who saw themselves as making a new start, one that would avoid the territorial squabbles and rivalries of the European states. By avoiding treaties and alliances and remaining neutral, they believed that the United States would only become involved in war when attacked, that is, when directly threatened.Thomas Jefferson, the third president, spoke about avoiding “entangling alliances in Europe” (Powaski, 1991, p.

x) The Spanish-American War of 1898 was a departure from this policy, although many Americans convinced themselves that their involvement was not motivated by imperial ambition but by a commitment to spread democracy and freedom. Nor did the war involve Europe or any foreign alliances, since the US prosecuted the war “without allies” (Powaski, p. ix). The US entered World War I reluctantly and only because Germany was sinking US ships, which could be regarded as a direct attack.Although President Woodrow Wilson was the main architect of the League of Nations, he could not persuade a skeptical Congress to support this and the US did not join.

Future President Franklin D. Roosevelt, then Navy Secretary, also supported the League as an instrument to prevent future war but reconciled himself to the reality that it would, effectively, operate only in the European sphere, following the so-called Monroe Doctrine of 1832, that the US would not become involved in European wars while Europe should not intervene in the Western hemisphere.This left the US outside the main international body tasked with preventing war. During the Great Depression of the 1930s, the US government was focused on domestic issues and economic recovery and foreign policy took a back seat. Despite the fact that Roosevelt, President from 1933 to 1945, was an internationalist in outlook and believed that the US had a vital role to play in helping to secure world peace, isolationists dominated Congress.

Several examples of their strength can be identified. First, the Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1937 and 1939 prohibited the US from aiding any side in a war and from selling arms to either although commerce was allowed, with certain limitations. There were earlier Acts in 1794, 1817 and 1838. Travel to the belligerent states, loans to them and were banned.

When the second Act was passed, Roosevelt was anxious to try to aid Britain and her allies if, as feared, war broke out with Germany.He agreed to the clause, known as the “cash-and-carry provision” that allowed the US to supply other goods should war begin provided that cash payment was made. The Act was intended to keep the US out of “foreign wars” (Powaski, p. 72). Even more indicative of the strength of isolationist thinking, although this proposal did not succeed, was the Ludlow Amendment of 1938, which called for a referendum before any declaration of war even following an attack on the US (Powaski, p.

74). The amendment was defeated but only by a narrow margin, 209 to 188 in the House of Representatives.During the election campaign of 1940, candidate Wendell Willkie assured citizens that if he was elected “no American boys will ever be sent to the shambles of the European trenches” and Roosevelt dropped “except in case of attack” from his own statement that “your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars” (Meacham, 2004, p. 74). Many isolationists believed US neutrality supported peace.

As a major military power, the US would remain neutral during any conflict, enabling its diplomats to assist in brokering peace. By selling arms to neither side, the US would not help to escalate any conflict.By then, World War II had started. Public opinion in the US was by no means one sided with reference to the war. Many supported Britain, seeing her as defending freedom but others thought that the US should wait to see which side won and could still do business with a victorious Germany, despite the nature of the Nazi regime. Roosevelt strongly sympathized with the British and their allies but still faced strong isolationist opposition to any involvement.

The famous pilot, Charles A. Lindbergh was a spokesman for isolationism, who blamed special interests, Jews and the Roosevelt for “pressing the country toward war” (Meacham, p. 27).Then, according to polls, only 7. 7 percent of Americans favored entering the war and only 19 percent “believed that the country should intervene if the defeat of the Allies appeared certain” while 40 percent opposed involvement in any circumstances (Meacham, p. 55).

Roosevelt designed the Lend-Lease Act (1941) in order to support Britain by means “short of war” promising that American military personnel would not be involved (Doenecke, p. 191). The Act allowed the sale (lease) of arms to the Allies but not to Germany. Protecting shipments as they crossed the Atlantic was expressly prohibited by the Act.However, Roosevelt ordered naval and air patrols to protect the ships: these were “denounced by one constitutional authority as unconstitutional ‘acts of war’ (Doenecke, p.

193). Some ships were transferred to foreign flags (Panama) so that the charge that the US was breaking the Neutrality Act by protecting its own ships bound for a warring state could be avoided. Public opinion in the United States only shifted in favor of US involvement following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. The next day, Congress endorsed a declaration of war, ending neutrality and weakening isolationism as the dominant foreign policy idea.