Euthyphro’s suggestion that piety is a part of justice is perhaps as close to a definition of piety that we ever receive in the dialogue of Euthyphro. This is because of all the explanations offered by Euthyphro, this one comes closest to measuring piety with a valid, universal standard.
Euthyphro’s first suggestion, that piety is what he is doing now, is not only merely an example, not a definition, but Euthyphro is so pompous as to use himself as the standard with which to measure piety. Of course, no one person should be used as a standard for anything.Individuals are not rigid or stable and certainly not universal. He gives no support to his statement; he simply asserts it, as if it should be obvious.
Socrates says that defining piety as, “what [ Euthyphro is] doing now”, is not a sufficient definition because it is simply an example of piety. Something cannot be defined by an example. Euthyphro cannot base a definition of piety on his own actions. He commits the fallacy of self-reference; using his own actions as the standard. The standard Euthyphro gives, (himself), is not specific or universal enough for others to use in judging their own actions.Therefore it fails as a useful standard of piety.
Euthyphro’s second definition is that piety is that which is dear to the gods. In other words, actions that are pleasing to the gods are pious, and actions that are displeasing to them are impious. Socrates pretends to be pleased with this definition because Euthyphro seems as if he may have finally provided a model with which to measure all pious things. Euthyphro states that actions being pleasing to the gods provides a standard that should enable everyone to recognize what is pious and what is impious.Socrates reminds him that piety and impiety are not the same thing, they are opposites. The gods do not seem to agree on much of anything, let alone that which is just or good, and certainly that which is pleasing.
So the same thing that is loved by one of piety. What is pious of one god may be impious to another. Euthyphro’s second definition is inherently self- contradictory. Therefore it is certainly not useful as a standard of measuring piety.
Euthyphro’s third definition of piety states that, “piety is that which is dear to all the gods.In other words, anything that all the gods love, in unanimous agreement, is pious. That which they all collectively hate, is impious. To check the validity of this argument, Socrates then is it pious because they love it? ” This may simply be circular reasoning. Although it’s certainly an interesting question, it fails to supply any qualities that are universally valid.
Socrates and Euthyphro seem to agree that the gods love piety because it is pious, not that something is defined as pious because it is loved by the gods. However, they both completely fail at defining piety.Not only in this particular argument, but throughout the whole story they fail in this endeavor. The statement that, “the pious is loved by the gods because it is pious”, never explains what feature it is in piety that makes it loveable. He only explains one affect of piety, that it is loved by all of the gods.
This statement still fails to supply an unchanging standard with which to measure piety. In conclusion, Socrates appears to long for a perfect, personal and unchanging standard for piety, ( a faultless, unchanging god perhaps), based on a flawless being whose moral standards are perfect and concrete.Unfortunately, both Socrates and Euthyphro fail to give any specific instances of either piety or justice. However, they do deal with the criteria by which such standards could be found.
Euthyphro’s argument that piety is a part of justice, specifically that part concerning the care of the gods, comes closer to satisfying Socrates than all the other arguments. At least this definition uses skillful service as the criteria as opposed to the previous definitions which use Euthyphro himself, the emotional, ever-changing gods, and that which all the gods can agree on.We can only answer Socrates primary question, (what is piety), once we have a solid, universal standard by which to measure piety. The statement that piety is a part of justice comes the closest to answering Socrates’ inquiry because justice is as close to a universal, unchanging standard that Euthyphro ever reaches in this particular dialogue.
Justice at least has somewhat of a solid meaning. Although it may differ slightly from society to society and era to era, it is certainly more universal than an individual (Euthyphro) or the gods, and what they find pleasing. For our purposes, it is as close to a standard that is ever reached in Euthyp
