On Hobbes’ Volunti Non Fit Injuria

In 1625, with his work Law of War and Peace, Hugo Grotius instigated a new approach in viewing and analyzing natural law by proposing that this law permits human beings (who may either subscribe to the same God or to immensely different divine entities) which are by nature companionable yet cantankerous to manage to live and cope in the presence of one another typical to that of a society. This law is assumed to be rooted on empirical grounds which entail experiential premises.Thomas Hobbes then later extended the proposition that was pursued by Grotius by claiming that human beings who are guided by their self-seeking principle required external aid which Hobbes sees fit as help coming from other men either through material or immaterial support.

However, since men are always on the verge of succumbing to selfishness, they found the necessary task of forming into a single group difficult. Thus, certain laws and an authority that will oversee the activities of men and regulate their functions have to be established in the formation of the society.Far more important to note, however, is Hobbes’ conception of the natural law. An analysis of this law incites us to delve deeper into his endorsed principle of volunti non fit injuria which can be reiterated as a wrong is not done to one who knows and wills. In other words, the principle’s central theme revolves around the actions which are permitted by man himself to be done to him and that these actions, consequently is not a wrong action. Conversely, the man who grants permission to others to resort to actions which are to be given to him do not essentially result to injury.

The necessary link between the two will be apparent in the course of the discussion. Samuel von Pufendorf, on the other hand, argued against Hobbes’ picture of the state of nature which explicitly proposes that such state is imminently chaotic and is in constant war. Though both Pufendorf and Hobbes agree on the ground that there is the centrality of the state of nature in the corroboration of individuals in the creation of the society nature and that man is selfish, they have disagreeing views on the very notion on the state of the.While Hobbes maintains that the state of nature is chaotic, Pufendorf on the other hand argues that the state of nature is essentially not chaotic. Though Pufendorf endorses the premise that the state of nature resembles that of a peaceful state, nevertheless he qualifies this state as one embodying peace which is unstable and frail and lacks the guarantee of security in the sense that it cannot provide a strong measure for the conservation and defense for the life of man unless an external reinforcement installs veritable conditions which will strengthen it. This reverts us back to Hobbes’ principle volunti non fit injuria.

Volunti non fit injuria A focal point in Hobbes’ Leviathan is worth noting at the onset of volunti non fit injuria. Hobbes’ defines a free man as “he that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to do. (Hobbes)” To help us analyze the context of volunti non fit injuria on a far more deeper plane, it is of good use for us to dwell first and foremost on Hobbes’ definition of a free man. For one to be free, one condition must be met—the capacity to be free, or that which is the primary reason for one to be actually free.Indeed, the very basic assumption which serves as the primary background for the establishment of the fact that one is truly free is one’s innate capacity to be free, that which in its absence removes man’s ability to be free per se, so that a free man is essentially one who has originally had the capacity in himself to be free and that through his unrestrained actions he makes manifest this capacity to be free thereby assuring one as a free man.

Once we are able to comprehend the very nature of the term free in Hobbes’ notion of a free man, we can be able to further probe into the principle of volunti non fit injuria.Let us then proceed to provide a piecemeal analysis of the principle a wrong is not done to one who knows and wills (volunti non fit injuria) through a careful assessment of every term included in it as well as its contextual relation to the other key terms integrated in the same principle. A wrong is not done. This key phrase should point us to several worth-noting insights. First, what can be intended with the usage of the term wrong is not necessarily that which concerns morality as a standard in its whole, nor should it be limited to a sense of “right and wrong” for it is indeed one of narrow limits.

Rather, the term (though not synonymously) refers to injury or the infliction of harm. Thus, when it is said that a wrong is not done, what is being implied is that no injury is caused or inflicted. One who knows and wills. By stating one who knows and wills, there is an underlying presumption that the one being referred to also has the capacity or has the innate ability to “know” and to “will”, for without these capacities it would be logically impossible for one to ever make manifest the endeavor of knowing and willing.

Thus, it is of primary necessity that one be possessed with the intrinsic capacity to know and to will for one to eventually actualize these possibilities. Moreover, it should also be noted that attached to the very concepts of being able to know and to will is the presumption that the individual is free. Relegating our thoughts to Hobbes’ definition of a free man, such concept further enables one to meet the manifestation of knowing and willing, such that with the absence of restrictions which may hinder the two intrinsic capacities one is then guaranteed of knowing and willing.A wrong is not done to one who knows and wills.

The apparent reinterpretation of such statement can be understood in the sense that no harm is inflicted or caused to a person given the fact that the same person comprehends the deed and has willed for the deed. Thus, for example, when a man wills that he be engaged in a fierce competition for survival with other men and knows that such is the case and that the competition opens the great possibility of being able to inflict physical damages unto him, no wrong, harm, or injury is to be considered for the very reason that none of those will be brought forth.In other words, no harm, injury, or wrong is essentially observed, in the strictest sense, along the manifestation of the deed. The facts that the man has willed for his engagement in the competition and that the man knows the physical damages which can come across his way ultimately removes any notion of wrong, harm, or injury which one may suggest as immediate consequences of the deed in the strictest definition of those terms. Hobbes’ natural lawWhile man is believed to be selfish in the state of nature, it can be seen that in such a state the lives of men are solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short (Hobbes) and that, consequently, every man will seek to preserve himself.

In the course of such a self-preserving attitude of every man, conflicting desires eventually materialize and, thus, the lives of men are placed on the verge of succumbing to death. At first, every man will seek to preserve his life above everything else, and this very well amounts to the pursuit of power of every man so that he will be on top and sustain his life.With this mindset installed in the consciousness of every man, each of one of them will then have to will to engage their selves in such a stiff struggle and that they, too, know the immediate consequences of such a willing. And accordingly, a wrong is not done to one who knows and wills in the context of Hobbes’ state of nature.

Thus, the principle volunti non fit injuria proceeds from the basic premises and presuppositions of Hobbes’ natural law. Pufendorf’s state of natureAs opposed to Hobbes’ concept of the state of nature, Pufendorf on the other hand maintains that the state of nature is a state of peace in the sense that “every man must cherish and maintain sociability (Pufendorf). ” Thus, Pufendorf will essentially contradict Hobbes’ principle of volunti non fit injuria for the reason that the state of nature for the former does not elicit the desire (if it be a desire) or the need (if it be a need) to engage in competition so as to sustain one’s existence.Rather, Pufendorf will argue that man will all the more benefit from socializing with other men through a form of dependency on one another and that this will not lead to a chaotic population of selfish individuals. In summary, Pufendorf’s claims can be interpreted as restrictions to Hobbes’ volunti non fit injuria principle in the sense that it removes the possibility of men willing to engage themselves in conflict with one another and that, hence, not only is there an apparent restriction on the conflict’s occurrence but also that it primarily removes the possibility of it from being conceived.

ConclusionThomas Hobbes’ state of nature clearly tells us that in such a state man’s life is held to be chaotic and that the consequences of the state of nature is a solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short life. Since men are inherently selfish and seek self-preservation above anything else, they will opt to engage in competition with other men in order to fulfill their desires and sustain their lives. This leads eventually to his principle volunti non fit injuria, such that no wrong is actually inflicted upon men for they have willed to engage themselves into such a competition in furthering their lives.Thus, the state of nature, though chaotic, is essentially one which is devoid of the issue of the infliction of harm or injury to other men. Samuel von Pufendorf, on the other hand, claims that the state of nature of Hobbes is not necessarily the case for the reason that man will socialize with other men so as to provide the sustenance of their lives and preserve themselves without much concern over the rest. Hence, the concept of volunti non fit injuria simply does not arise in Pufendorf’s conception of the state of nature.