Ideas, much like nature, survive the trials of time and overcome the obstacles of challenge to prevail stronger and more resolute; such is the case with warfare as it came about in the Napoleonic era, as it precepts have flourished and pervaded into current doctrine and practice. Warfare in the Napoleonic era is fundamentally similar to warfare as it is conducted at present, as the ideas of a national army, combined arms corps-centered organizational structure, and maneuver warfare prevail in today’s era.The Napoleonic Era saw the rise of the national army, comprised of citizens of France who had personal interest in the welfare of the nation instead of soldiers who were unemotionally attached and lacked loyalty to the cause. Prior to the French Revolution, the majority of European armies consisted of peasants, prisoners, and paid mercenaries. The soldiers of this era felt little to no loyalty to their mostly aristocratic superiors and as a whole could not relate to the ruling monarch’s cause for whichever engagement they were required to participate.
Order was maintained through constant drill and harsh discipline, yet desertion and mutiny were still common. The French Revolution of 1789 saw the near dissolution of this type of military makeup, and instead gave rise to a national army of more willing participants who were prepared to defend the new Republic against foes both domestic and abroad. Napoleon Bonaparte inherited this post-Revolutionary army which was comprised of more dedicated and patriotic French citizens, who were therefore more reliable and disciplined, less likely to desert, and believed in what they were risking their lives.What the French Army lacked in numbers of volunteers was filled by the levee en masse decrees of 1793 and the Jourdan Law of 1798, which revitalized the conscription systems and served as the main source of Napoleon’s troops.
These systems reinforced the national army concept as citizens continued to fill the need for soldiers, much as similar systems have done for the U. S. in times of war. In addition, France and later Prussia created a new officer corps based on talent and experience as opposed to solely birth or social status.The officer corps, once dominated by aristocrats, became more professional as merit replaced status as qualification for promotion.
Officer education also became a more established institution, and Prussia even created a war college to train staff officers. Today, the U. S. Army maintains a professional officer corps in which education is paramount to promotion and many resources are allocated to training centers such as the service academies, the War College, and numerous other Department of Defense mandated courses.During the Napoleonic era, the French restructured the Revolutionary Army into the model which is currently used by a multitude of nations and militaries today, including the U.
S. Army. After the Revolution, the French pioneered the use of the combat division, which combined infantry, cavalry, and artillery assets along with a few additional support units. Napoleon himself noted that “infantry, cavalry and artillery cannot do without one another. ”Evidence of the combined arms concept is seen in U.
S. Army doctrine and organization today and has been used in numerous conflicts and wars as recent as Vietnam, the Gulf War, and the Global War on Terrorism. Napoleon also organized the various divisions, brigades, and battalions into corps which could operate independently and sustain engagements for short periods. Such corps were the building blocks of Napoleonic warfare because of their unique abilities to achieve victory at the operational and tactical levels.Although Napoleon’s corps did not always operate decisively or maintain discipline when left on their own, these smaller, more agile structures did provide him with greater mobility, more command and control, and a simpler logistics process when Napoleon was present.
The U. S. Army today is organized into three active corps with various combined arms divisions in their structures and has experienced similar benefits as those of the Napoleonic Era.Napoleon completely changed the way warfare was conducted through a new style of maneuver warfare, which gave his army flexibility, mobility, and psychological advantages over the longstanding firing lines of the past. His main concept of warfare was a lightning-quick maneuver (later called a Blitzkrieg attack) that was boldly and aggressively aimed at the enemy’s main army, often catching the enemy by surprise.
His armies were certainly known for moving fast and were able to cover great distances in little time.One soldier commented that “the Emperor has discovered a new way of making war; he makes use of our legs instead of our arms! ” The war with Prussia at Jena-Auerstadt in 1806 was a classic example of this, as Napoleon’s army killed or captured 96 percent of the devastated Prussian Army in thirty-three days. He also employed his classic manoeuvre sur les derrieres, a flanking movement that distracted his enemies near the front while attacking them from the rear.In this manner he was able to command the enemy’s line of retreat with one of his corps while actively pursuing them with another. Napoleon also believed in concentrating firepower in order to overwhelm enemy defenses and secure objectives.
In order to do this, he expanded the French artillery corps and reorganized the cavalry, stating that “in battle skill consists in converging a mass of fire upon a single point. ” Additionally, he employed psychological warfare to his advantage such as feigning maneuvers, mobile screens, use of propaganda, and elaborate deception schemes.At Austerlitz in 1805, Austrian and Russian forces were gathered nearby after the Austrian defeat at Ulm, and instead of accepting his triumph and remaining idle, he feigned weakness on his right flank and was able to lure the Austro-Russian forces towards it while he broke through their center and pivoted south against their left wing. The allies lost nearly a third of their original strength and Napoleon achieved a complete victory. Moreover, he maintained strict control of the French press, who were made to produce only the information or disinformation he wished the public, both friend and foe, to understand.
When he did move his forces, he used his cavalry to screen his movements and to also gather intelligence. In this way he was able to better conceal his intentions and strength from the enemy. Current U. S.
Army doctrine as described in Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, maintains many of the ideas of Napoleon’s maneuver warfare and serves as a basis for how the U. S. conducts combat operations in present time. There are undoubtedly some fundamental similarities between warfare in the Napoleonic era and warfare today, particularly in the employment of national armies, corps-centered structures, and maneuver warfare.The developments made during this era dramatically changed the way war was conducted by every army from then until now, and many of the sound strategies employed by Napoleon have found their way into modern U. S.
Army doctrine manuals. Through careful study of the Napoleonic era, one can gain a great deal of insight into how these strategies have been employed over the past 220 years and to what degree of success, which is highly valuable to any military member who may be faced with similar situations in warfare today.
