In “Aporias”, Jacques Derrida argues that Martin Heidegger’s statements about death and the nature of being are mistaken and flawed in their reasoning. To understand Derrida’s argument, one must first understand Heidegger’s meaning when he calls death a possibility of impossibility.

Heidegger is attempting to define the metaphysical and in short, Derrida does not approve of the definitions. Rather than attempt to explain what happens after death, Heidegger tried to explain that many options are possible, than even the impossible might be possible.By calling death a possibility of impossibility, he is essentially saying that because metaphysical ideas of death cannot be proven or disproven, one should accept the possibility of things that defy reason, the impossibility. Heidegger tries to apply science to philosophy and define the spiritual aspects of what happens after death and finds science lacking.

He determines that science cannot explain the metaphysical, but that there is evidence that the metaphysical should not be denied.Therefore, Heidegger argues that when evidence lacks explanation, it is sometimes better to accept that there is no explanation rather than try to explain away the evidence. In “Aporias”, Derrida disagrees. He argues that life has a definitive ending and that accepting the possibility of impossibility is faulty and should not be done. In a lengthy, convoluted paragraph Derrida argues that death has finality. Before death, during life, there is possibility.

With the end of life, the possibility ends as well and to then determine that impossibility reigns after death is to simply speculate about things that have no real proof of existence.His deconstructionist approach forces him to question everything and in this work, he questions Heidegger the most. The problem from Derrida’s perspective is that Heidegger accepts as a given that there is a metaphysical nature to human life and that in some manner that metaphysical nature might continue beyond death. Unfortunately, he argues, it is acceptable to argue the possibility of the metaphysical before death because language allows the discussion of such an idea.Though proof of the metaphysical is an impossible possibility, he accepts that it is a possibility because we can think and communicate that it is. However, once death occurs, the ability to communicate thoughts about the metaphysical ends and therefore, by his assumption, the possibility of the metaphysical ends.

Thus, there is no chance of impossibility after death because there is no way to communicate about it. Derrida bases his argument on the study of animals and their inability to communicate about the metaphysical. In short, he ties the existence of language to the existence of a soul.If a creature does not have the capability to communicate about the metaphysical, then it cannot have any ties to the metaphysical. Apes and other creatures that have developed rudimentary abilities to communicate with humans, for example, would not have souls because they do not understand the concept of the soul. For them, death is death.

To follow the argument to the next logical step, Derrida claims, is to argue that because the dead also cannot communicate about the existence of a soul or any other metaphysical idea, all metaphysics must cease to be at the moment of death.Communication is necessary for the existence of things like a soul and god, so because the dead cannot readily communicate to the living that there are such things, there must not be. Once a person is dead, they are dead. In all, it seems like a circular argument and flawed in that it does not taken into account the possibility that human understanding is preventing the communication and not the animals or the dead themselves. For example, some students of the metaphysical claim to speak with the dead.

If then only some humans can “hear” the discussions o the dead regarding the metaphysical, would it not be logical to argue that only those who humans that can communicate with the dead have souls. Because the communication necessitates speaking or communicating across boundaries such as state or being or species, by Derrida’s argument, it would make sense that only those capable of communicating across the boundaries would have a soul or other tie to the metaphysical. By his reasoning, apes cannot communicate to humans regarding the existence of the metaphysical.And, we are unable to determine what they might be able to communicate amongst themselves. So, if some humans are not able to communicate with dead humans regarding the existence of all things metaphysical, one would have to accept that those humans are not tied to the metaphysical either. The only way it could work in reverse and be the fault of the dead that they cannot communicate with human beings would be to presuppose that humans are the highest echelon of intelligent beings and that the failure of communications with other species lies with them, not us.

Derrida’s arguments about Heidegger’s ideals are flawed and cannot be proven. That does not mean that Heidegger is right, but rather it expands on the unknowing. If then we cannot discuss the metaphysical because we do not truly understand it, would we not have to argue that we have no ties to and human life may be nothing more than a biological function?