Democracy and Power: Some Unpopular Ideas

“Democracy” as a catch all term of political approbation is to be found everywhere, used to describe systems of radically different character.

It is largely used as a political slang term, used to give “approval” to policies or ideas the speaker likes. Hence, given this, a formal definition must be found. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines democracy this way: To fix ideas, the term “democracy,” refers very generally to a method of group decision making characterized by a kind of equality among the participants at an essential stage of the collective decision making.Four aspects of this definition should be noted. First, democracy concerns collective decision making, by which I mean decisions that are made for groups and that are binding on all the members of the group. Second, this definition means to cover a lot of different kinds of groups that may be called democratic.

. . . Third, the definition is not intended to carry any normative weight to it.

It is quite compatible with this definition of democracy that it is not desirable to have democracy in some particular context. So the definition of democracy does not settle any normative questions.Fourth, the equality required by the definition of democracy may be more or less deep. It may be the mere formal equality of one-person one-vote in an election for representatives to an assembly where there is competition among candidates for the position. Or it may be more robust, including equality in the processes of deliberation and coalition building. (Christiano, 2006) This wordy definition will be the centerpiece of this paper when dealing with specifically American approaches to this problem.

It is broad and inclusive enough so as to understand its essential qualities without ideological overtones.Democracy has a long history, from the aristocratic type found in classical Athens to the revolutionary type found in France after 1789 to the liberal variant practiced in America in 2009. But it also has a long history of opposition, from Plato to Nietzsche, where “democracy” is associated with either relativism or mediocrity. The American republic was meant to combine elements of various political systems into a rational balance. The presidency, generally weak and symbolic, was meant to represent monarchy. Its virtues were stability and visibility.

Secondly, the unelected Senate was meant to represent aristocracy, whose virtues were wisdom, old age and property, hence, having a stake in the community and a voice for stability. Lastly, the democratic or popular branch was the House of Representatives, who alone had the power to tax and, as of old, coin money. But this is far from a democratic system in the above definition: it weighed classes, not people. It weighed interests, not individuals. But this is the very root of republicanism: an essentially conservative institution where classes and interests rather than raw votes were tallied.

In other manners of speaking, one can speak of votes being “weighed” rather than “counted. ” In this case, democracy is one interest out of many, the democracy in early America was considered the property of Daniel Shay and his compatriots, while the Federalists represented various branches of an American “aristocracy” who, led by John Adams, valued stability and virtue over “counting votes,” and predictable, condemned the French Revolution (Ellis, 2001, 115-120). Note that this specifically American idea of “democracy” or the “republic of virtue” nicely fits the first definition given above, that of “collective decision making.”In this case however, it is a decision of classes working together representing various interests rather than the mere counting of votes. Even further, institutions such as the media and judiciary also act as a brake on “popular opinion” either by frustrating it in the case of the courts, or manipulating it, as in the case of the major media. But this concept of the “republic of virtue” also says that democracy is one value among others.

It remains true that the popular voice needs to be heard and heeded, but at the same time, that it should be a, not the, voice.Hence, the republic crated by the Federalist party after their defeat of Daniel Shay took his revolution into account by giving the money power (in theory) to the House, while just making sure that the Senate (the aristocracy, so to speak) could only approve such bills, not originate them (Szatmary, 1980, 120-135). For the likes of Washington or Adams (and even Jefferson, once he became president) Daniel Shay was the worst that democracy had to offer: the uneducated rabble with guns, still a major nightmare for politicians the world over.But there is good reason to hold that the Federalists got their way precisely because of the attack of Shay on the state of Massachusetts, the home of John Adams. Maybe the majority were not the font of wisdom after all? Or were Federalists merely frustrated old world aristocrats? It is the last element in the definition above that causes problems.

It is not the expression of the popular will, but the question of equality of that will with other wills in society that cause the problem. This might be one way of characterizing the debate between Federalists and anti-Federalists in America.In the definition used above, the question is a matter of “normative content” versus proper procedure. Procedure is not a normative issue, it is a mechanical one. The real question is the result of deliberation. Even the question of deliberation itself is a problem: can one hold that the “popular will” deliberates? Based on what? What of the media’s role in shaping opinions? The issue is not a matter of mechanics: an aristocrat can look with satisfaction in the basically aristocratic constitution of the Federalist party as well as old England.

In both cases, one is assured that the popular movements cannot dictate policy, but only help shape it. In Adams’ Model Constitution for the State of Massachusetts, the question, right in the preamble, is not the equality of citizens, but the “protection of their rights” that is the primary duty of the state (Adams, 1779/1954, 95). Hence, the question would naturally be a balance among social forces rather than the leveling of the English Diggers or the French Revolutionaries.In section VII of this same model, Adams holds that the point of this constitution is the “safety and happiness” of the people and not the “private interest of any one man, family or class of men. ” But this also precludes the democracy of the French model: in this case, the demos is as limited as the aristocracy or the privileged.

At the same time, in his huge Defense of the Constitution, Adams writes the following: “The rich, the well born, and the able acquire an influence among the people that will soon be too much for simple honesty in the House of Representatives” (Adams, 1786/1954, 115).This says quite a bit. The fact is that the issue of equality mentioned at the end of our definition above is unattainable, since the well born and able have every means at their disposal to manipulate the population, to mobilize and fund movements and to create and thus manage dissent. While Adams holds that free governments are impossible without a popular house, he holds that it is impossible without checks on this house as well.

But this question is not a matter of having too powerful a voice, but who manipulates that voice, and who seeks to “speak” for the popular will.All manifestations of the popular will are to some extent undemocratic in the strong sense of the term in that these movements have leaders, their own private aristocracy that leads, funds and seeks to speak for the group. And it seems that the “well born and able” always have a strong influence in the mobilization of these groups. Inequality, Adams says, is written in the very constitution of nature (Adams, 1789/1954, 139) and hence, no constitution can ignore it.

But just as the poor should be controlled and checked, so should the rich and the well born.Neither faction can rule on its own, and both factions are a part of the natural order, since some win the struggle in life and others lose. There is no getting out of that. Even if the state was to level society, this process would itself create its own aristocracy: the politicians and leaders who put it into action and hence become enriched as the state grows in power. Inequality is built into the very constitution of society previous to any state: all the state can do is make sure that the population maintains its rights relative to one another.But as far as “normative” ends are concerned (e.

g. “Equality” or “fraternity), the state cannot guarantee anything that is not already written into the heart of nature and its functioning. Therefore, if inequality and diversity are found in nature (as well as human nature) then no constitution can legislate it out of existence. It is therefore not a matter of demanding equality or legislating fraternity, but of protecting rights, and permitting individuals and classes to come to their own consensus.But whatever consensus they might come to, it can never result in the diminution of rights. Therefore, at a very minimum, a republic differs from a democracy (especially in the Federalist idea) in that no “popular movement” can function at the expense of some other element in the population.

No group or organized interest can vitiate the rights of some other group. Hence, a republic permits public policies that arrange relations between individuals and groups on the basis of shared rights and responsibilities.Democracy, therefore, in its strong and pure form, is out of the question because here, the majority can dispossess the minority or worse, the minority can manipulate the majority for its own purposes. This brief paper has sought to define democracy and get a glimpse of how much a view is placed within the constitution.

Some of the ideas of the arch-federalist John Adams have been examined to add some authority to these observations, and his basic view can be reduced to this: first, that democracy is a good, not the good, and, second, that inequality is a part of life and cannot be eradicated.Therefore, if one puts these two axioms together, one gets a balanced constitution where the laws are created by co-operation among classes, not the domination of the poor over the rich or the rich over the poor. The rich are preserved in their fortunes, but the constitution of the state prevents them from dominating the laws or their enforcement. Even more, the very movements of the “popular will” are often themselves the creation of the rich and powerful for their own ends.

At best, the state can balance forces and protect rights, not engage in revolutionary leveling.