'Realism' permeates the very deepest level of philosophical thought.
From the wildest cosmogonical fantasies to the ways in which people deal with every conscious moment, 'realism' is impossible to ignore. Everything is either a precept to, or a contingency of, our views on realism. The debates surrounding all these ideas lie far beyond the remit of this essay. This essay seeks to debate the arguments of the pre-eminent thinkers associated with realism in terms of film. Then to provide a philosophical basis for their opinions, by which their arguments shall be weighted.It is necessary therefore, to establish this basis - this 'value system' - by which the arguments shall be judged.
David Hume's theories of epistemology shall form the basis of this 'value system'. Every aspect of our knowledge is gained by experience: Specifically by sensual experience of the physical world. In this respect, reality is not ontological, it is the sum of our sensual and rational experiences. It is not a precept, it is an existential conclusion of the world in which we live, and the way we experience it; and the sum of this we call reality.
It is purely descriptive; a conclusion of perception. The electromagnetic radiation to which our retina is sensitive, the variations in molecular density detectable by our inner ear, the molecules which cause chemical reactions in our nervous system: These experiences we term; sight and hearing, touch and taste. This information, this knowledge, is collected and compounded according to how it affects us, and it is concluded as our physical surroundings, and termed our reality.Reality is where we exist, reality is what we see and hear, reality is the conclusions determinable by our sensual experience. Film - by definition - delivers this kind of sensual information, but what claim can it lay to being concluded in the same ways as we conclude the actual experiences that film seeks to reproduce. The spiritual father of the New Wave,1 Andre Bazin wrote extensively on realism in film.
The recurring theme of his argument is reproduction; duplication2 of reality. He argued convincingly of the exactness of film.He saw film as a realist revolution in the arts, emancipating the 'photo-realistic' baroque artists to the '4th dimension3'. Bazin spoke of film as an automatic, mechanical process; "for the first time an image of the world is formed automatically, without the creative intervention of man4".
However, Bazin then takes a step further and tries to confirm film as being not just tantamount to reality, but actually being its equivalent: "Film is the model [what is filmed], by virtue of the way it becomes a reproduction5".He is attempting to equate the filmed reproduction to the reality that is filmed. This is where his argument begins to lose credibility. Not only in the obvious physical impossibility of coexistent replication, but also in terms of our epistemological conclusions of film and reality. Bazin actually highlights many of the features that segregate film and reality: He states that film satisfies the "minds proclivity towards magic6".
However, the very fact we are considering it as 'magic' divorces it from reality.He terms the process 'objective,7' yet the photographer may manipulate the reproduction in many ways; by limiting focus, exposure levels, colour levels and the like. There is an act of sub-creation in the work of the photographer. He speaks of photography 'embalming time,' 'rescuing [models] from their proper corruption8'. Yet again, the act of doing so distinguishes film from its model, distancing it from reality.
So these features distinguish film from reality by the definition of the act of photography.However, if the film image is the only experience one has of the model, then it has to be the reality of the model. There is no choice to make comparisons to its similarity to the model. It has to be taken as the fact, mitigated only by the other fact; that it is not the model, just a reproduction! This draws me to the conclusion to be made on Bazin; mitigated reality; "a hallucination that is also a fact9". Another area not addressed by Bazin is the knowledge of film as an artifice reproduction.
Suspension of disbelief is a prerequisite to experiencing film.We know it is not the reality of its model, that it is a reproduction. Brecht saw that to have impact a filmmaker must embrace this prerequisite and "remind the audience of the artifice. 10" Like a stage play, the audience knows it is not the reality it purports to be.
Contrary to Bazin's theory of film being "unburdened by interpretation", Brecht would see the essence of film in the interpretation. That the "expression of spirituality,11" was what gave it reality, rather than "pure psychological duplication12". So now we see reality designated in two conflicting schools.Bazin's mechanical sub creative, duplication and Brecht's interpretation of an obvious artifice.
This forces a return to the epistemological mould. While Bazin is correct in his assertion that film is a duplication of the model in almost total exactness, he does not make an account of how ones' conclusion of the sensual reception will be different with film. To speak of objectivity - as Bazin does - is to tread on thin ice. Pure objectivity - in a Platonic Forms sense - is no more possible with film than it is with the model reality.
Objectivity in terms of likeness and exactness is, however, possible. Yet every agent of sensual perception will perceive according to a different epistemological experience. No two people will draw the exact same conclusions on the same reproduction. This is due to their different experiences and could lead to vastly opposing conclusions. So Bazin's theory takes us as far as the sensual reception, but we must look more to Brecht's theory for the conclusion.
Could reality be in the eye of the beholder?If this were the case; reality would not be definable by the sensual experience, but rather by the consciousness of him that experiences. By the conclusions of what is experienced, by the interpretation alone, almost totally ignorant of the common sensual experience. In the film Artificial Intelligence13, David's mother, when resurrected, could only be alive for as long as she had the ability to draw conclusions from sensual experience [being awake]. Once she fell asleep she would forget, and thus no longer exist, no longer be part of reality.According to this theory the only reality is in the conclusions drawn from the sensual experience. Reality is solely determined by the conclusion.
So a garbled uncomprehendable message would not be reality. Yet does her lapse into unconsciousness and thus out of existence exclude her from being reality in David's mind. She would not be there to be perceived, but would exist in his memory, would she then be real? And would a film be more real by virtue of it presenting a sensual stimulus or less real as it, in itself, is less real than a person, who did exist and was real for that period?This is a fantastical question impossible to answer, yet it highlights how the nature of receiving sensual information [knowledge] from a film is only classified as reality, or nor, by the conclusions of the receiver. Film is light and it is sound and in that sense it is reality, in the same way as all other light and sounds.
Yet it falls short on other sensual 'checks'. With film we can only see and hear but not touch, like the moon or the sun, they are real - or so we think - and as they are not subject to all our sensual checks we concluded they were fantastical, divine entities.And then science changed all that. We were told they were reality, but this is a supplement to the sensual experience, like being told film is not its model, it is a reproduction. If we were not told that then maybe we too would flee for safety from the Lumiere brothers train growing larger on the screen, but no closer. It becomes clear that the argument is self destructive, there are too many contingencies to draw a solid conclusion.
It is a game of chess between a white knight and a black bishop. If neither of the pieces accommodates the other the argument can continue ad ifinitum.The contingency is the nature of the consciousness, how the conclusion is draw from the sensual experience. Bazin and Brecht's opposing ideas each find their place in the determination of what is reality: Bazin the deliverance of the experience, its sheer similarity, exactness even, to the model.
Brecht's interpretation of how what is experienced is concluded. They are different parts of the same system. Films are 'reality' in that they are experienced in the same way as many of the models it copies are experienced.Yet the conclusions determine whether the psyche determines it as reality.
Nochlin finds a conclusion of sorts; film mirrors reality, it is an illusion, but to the senses it is also a fact, whether it is reality depends upon the nature of the experience and, most importantly, how it is concluded. Jurassic Park has no model in contemporary 'reality' capable of being experienced. Film is reality mitigated by the fact that it is not what it purports to be. Yet in terms of conscious conclusions, after seeing film, Hume might think that reality is a question of sheer will.
