A change in Britain’s Foreign Policy-Making

At the end of World War II, the four western European states that had played a leading role in world affairs for most of the first half of the twentieth century, were now much weaker than before. One of these was Britain, which though it still seemed strong and victorious with her empire still intact, the cost of the war had been ruinous. The USA had helped to keep Britain going during the war by sending supplies, but these had to be paid for later.

So in 1945, though Britain was still a world power it increasingly had to adapt its international commitments: to the financial limitations of relative economic decline; to costly technological progress, especially in nuclear weapons; and to external challenges of European integration, colonial nationalism and Soviet imperialism. The need to make substantial adjustments was particularly obvious during the administration of Eden1, Macmillan2 and Douglas-Home3 from 1955 to 1964. However, Britain's future international priorities and the necessary financial and military cutbacks were highly controversial. So controversial in fact was Britain's intervention in the Suez Canal conflict of 1956; which intervention left Britain humiliated and with an effect on its future foreign policy-making.General consequences.The consequences of Suez were far-reaching, particularly in public.

British policymakers had known for years of their underlying weaknesses, but the public image, accentuated by 1940, 1945 and post-war recovery, was of a country that was still a major power. For an Egyptian ex-colonel to twist the lion's tail, and get away with it, was a blatant and lasting blow to national self-esteem and international prestige. Nasser4's successful defiance made him into Third World hero, encouraging anti-colonial nationalists elsewhere. American and Russian influence increased in the Middle East and no British leader ever made the mistake of trying to defy the USA on a major issue.

Quite obviously, the aftermath of the war saw a developing rift in Anglo-American relations, partly due to America's un-involvement in the war and for Eisenhower's lack of support for Eden to restore his power over Britain and his party.5 However, relations with America were soon restored and it is quite clear to state that since the Suez conflict, the British have never been able to make a foreign policy independent of the USA.6 The British action soon lost them an ally in Iraq, where premier Nuri-es-Said came under increasing attack from the Arabs of his pro-British attitude. He was murdered in 1958.7 For France the lessons of Suez were also far-reaching, but different.

Having subsumed its forces under British command, itself a striking concession, it now felt betrayed by Britain and even more by the USA. France's irritation with NATO and its enthusiasm for a European Community were both greatly accentuated by the crisis.8The Long-Term Consequences on Britain and its Foreign Policy.There exist divergent views and perspectives about the Suez impact over Britain and its foreign policy. Some argue that Suez impact was relatively unimportant while others see it as the turning point in Britain's foreign policy making after World War II.

In Brittania Overruled, David Reynolds argues:...The impact of Suez should not be exaggerated. Relations with America were soon restored, Britain remained an important power east of Suez and the crisis itself probably did not prompt a new policy on African decolonisation.

..Suez was idiosyncratic, revealing oddities of the moment as much as underlying trends in decline of British power. Thus, the collapse of the operation owed much to the gaping divisions in Whitehall..

.9On the other hand, David Carlton despite stating that " ...

it does not follow that the country today would be significantly different if the episode (the Suez crisis) had never occurred10 ", in Anthony Eden: a Biography, he argues that "with perspective Suez may come to seem relatively unimportant event in and of itself, more an effect than a cause of national decline."11 For the fact is that Great Britain, given its modest base in terms of population and economic strength, had been over committed throughout the world since at least the end of the Second World War (and maybe for much longer). Retreat from formal and informal Empire was inevitable, as was decline as a global power. This could have been arranged smoothly or otherwise. But reduction to the level of a post-imperial medium power by the 1980's was surely unavoidable.

Suez on this view was a rather dramatic hiccup in a generally well-managed transition.