Our role-play negotiation team has five members. Negotiator plays the key role during the negotiation process whereas others tend to be observer or calculator instead of analyst or summariser due to the passive and reticent performance throughout the whole negotiation. Theoretically speaking, channelling all communication through a team spokesperson reduces the inadvertent revelation of information (Roy J. Lewicki, 2003).
In addition to reducing the number of people who can actively reveal information, this allows other members of the negotiating team to observe and listen carefully to what the other party is saying so they can detect clues and pieces of information about the other party's position. However, as a newly formed team, learning to work or collaborate together effectively is uneasy. Collaborative learning as the basis for effective organizational team building requires a level of personal familiarity, intimacy and trust, allowing team members to listen to one another with respect and understanding (Bright,1998).
But, for most newly formed teams, achieving this level of personal interaction and team harmonisation are not an easy or a natural process and sometimes it could be problematic. There are too many factors affect a new team; we need time to build harmonization and to use individual diversity effectively. When contributing to a team, I am quick to see advantage of new opportunities and take it, especially during distributive negotiation, also I try to sense each possible alternative and concession from the other party since I don't want to face temporary unpopularity if it leads to worthwhile results in the end.
But, the negotiation should be well prepared, structured and controlled, otherwise I feel not at ease. More preparatory works like role allocation and discoursing order should be well arranged beforehand to avoid unnecessary nervous occurred from disorder of individual role, which brought negative influence for the whole negotiation overall. Also, it should avoid being dominated by one 'Shaper' (Belbin's nine team roles,1996) and other members seem to be aloof about the issues, which lead to perform passively and reticently.
Furthermore, sometimes, I should listen comprehensively instead of be selective listening or hear what I interested and used value judgments to evaluate the source of messages since I am apt to get too caught up in ideas that occur to me and so lose track of what is happening. When involved in a project with other people, I am always ready to back a good suggestion in the common interest. But I need to enhance my vigilant ability to prevent careless mistakes and omissions being made. Nevertheless, I can find a line of arguments to refute unsound propositions every now and then.
Reviewing the ES478 negotiation role play, our opponent's main tactic is snow job or kitchen sink (Roy J. Lewicki, 2003) through presenting much information about many different items, thus becomes difficult for us to detect which items are really important. At the beginning, they gave us a shock-opening offer that astonished our team member. Theoretic analysis indicates that negotiators who make exaggerated opening offers get higher settlements than do those who make low or modest opening offer (Roy J.
Lewicki, 2003). First, it gives our opponent room for movement and therefore allows their time to learn about our team's priorities. Second, an exaggerated opening offer acts as a metamessage and may create, in their mind, the impression that there is a long way to go before a reasonable settlement will be achieved; we felt that more concessions that originally intended may have to be made to bridge the difference between the two opening positions, as a result, we have been wrong in estimating their resistance point.
However, in the real negotiation situation, such opening offer could be summarily rejected by the other party and communicates an attitude of toughness that may be harmful to long-term relationships. In addition, opening stance can't be belligerence to attacking the positions, offers. In response, the other party may mirror the initial stance. Thus, moderateness and understanding position is better, even if the attitude is not mirrored, the other's response is likely to be constrained by such a moderate opening stance as let's be reasonable people who can solve this problem to our mutual satisfaction.
Also, during the distributive part of the role-play negotiation, they successfully adopt selective presentation to lead us to form the desired impression of their resistance point or to open up new possibilities for agreement that are more favourable to them than those that currently exist. Nevertheless, we play well in displaying emotional reaction to facts, proposals and possible outcomes through which to provide information about what is important to them.
As to the language we used, I think our team can perform better if we ask value-free, informational questions to find out what our counterpart's underlying needs are. Next, avoid judgmental styles of questioning, even though my first instinct is to use them since if not put these questions appropriately will help or hinder the obtaining responses. For example, during the role-play negotiation, I am not satisfied with the order they offer and asked instantaneously "How did you ever think you could get that order? " Actually, I put them on the defensive.
But if I say, "I'm not sure I understand why that order is so important to you. Can you explain your concerns? " Maybe I will far more likely to obtain useful information about our counterpart's underlying concerns. Finally, after intense negotiating, actually, in order to achieve profits, we can't reach any agreement at that time until we present several alternative packages to our counterpart since producing ideas or providing two or three alternative packages to counterpart in such a short time can be a very effective technique to closing a negotiation.
In terms of following machine negotiation, our opponent team has one core negotiator, two analysts, and one observer. Occasionally, the two analysts also play the role as the calculator and summariser. Since it's under competitive negotiating environment, we are use distributive bargaining tactics. Our role is the buyer, the seller gave an initial offer significantly lower than their target point and even lower than seller's resistance point in terms of unit price, quantity, delivery time,etc. Actually, we are in negative bargaining range and fell into stalemate every now and then.
The only way we can do is to make concession of our resistance points and then try to get the settlement as close to the other party's resistance point as possible or adjust our bargaining mix as well. Nevertheless, we all have same expectation of the negotiation results and know the outcome values and costs of termination (William,2003), we gradually have motivation and commitment to work together through identifying needs and problem-solving method, which makes the negotiation shift to integrative negotiation approach.
It's a big progress for both of the team and we signed a win-win contract finally. However, combining with negotiation theory, such kind of practice makes us feel that purely integrative or purely distributive negotiation situations are rare, most situations are mixed-motive, containing some elements that require distributive bargaining processes and others that require integrative negotiation. Negotiation case-study analysis: ---Pacific Oil Company Viewing from the whole case, I got a strong sense that the 'game' of entrapment was played well in this case on the part of Reliant Corporation.
Zinnser and Hauptmann set up the bait and Fontaine and Gaudin were hungry and ate it all up. The main reason why this happened was because vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) that Reliant was purchasing from Pacific Oil was becoming an excess supply in the market place, in other words, the market is changing from current years in which it was in high demand. From the standpoint of Reliant Corporation they were very aware of the markets surplus of VCM and the uprising competition that Pacific Oil was facing and they were ready to take full advantage of the current situation.
They knew the power they had over Pacific Oil and certainly used it in their favor. They set up a 'trap' that would effectively invite Pacific Oil in becoming the source of its own destruction. They lured Fontaine and Gaudin into this trap one step at a time. Also, they started of by negotiating a better price on the VCM, showing they were aware of the fact that the market was becoming more competitive and that they may be able to get a better deal elsewhere, whereby drop the price almost 1% per pound.
The next step in their 'game' was to sign a contract for only two years instead of the traditional five-year contract. Then they proposed to purchase less VCM from them, this process continued one step at a time and Pacific Oil became more deeply entrapped. Pacific Oil feared losing one its crucial clients in a time when they were in great need of their business in order to continue to remain competitive and make a profit at the same time.
Therefore they wanted to obtain a favourable renegotiation of the existing agreement, since they envisioned that there was a worldwide shortage of the VCM and that demand was continuing to rise, thus the current demand supply situation would remain for a number of years, whereby to justify a high favourable formula price for VCM after renegotiation. Furthermore, they would emphasize the relationship and reliable delivery and services during renegotiation. So, actually, they tend to adopt and follow an integrative negotiation approach. Fontaine and Gaudin represented Pacific Oil in negotiating a new contract with Reliant.
They adopt soft negotiation tactics throughout the whole negotiation process. They were both interested and distracted be the goal of the negotiations, which was for Reliant to remain loyal to their company by signing another five-year contract with them. Being blinded by this goal they were unaware they were agreeing to clauses put forth by Reliant that was not in their favor, therefore becoming trapped. Normally we would not see this occur if the circumstances were different in a way that they did not need Reliant's business as badly as they did.
The more and more Pacific Oil agreed to clauses brought forth by Reliant the more trapped they became as they came closer and closer to the reward of closing the deal and getting another contract signed. But how long would they wait? In this case the negotiations lasted for over a year this was probably because Fontaine and Gaudin needed to justify their course of action more then ever hoping that the time they put into this process of negotiations was not wasted. The only way entrapment could have been avoided in this negotiation is if Pacific Oil had just let go.
However this would have meant that Pacific Oil would have lost one of their main clients and the time they took to build that relationship would have been lost as well. In terms of both parties' main negotiation tactics, Pacific's negotiators try to use integrative negotiation with Reliant's negotiators, they fail to perceive that purely integrative or purely distributive negotiation situations are rare. Most situations are mixed-motive, containing some elements that require distributive bargaining processes and others that require integrative negotiation (Lewicki,2003).
For example, the common goal of making a profit provides a basis for collaboration building upon relationship, but how to allocate the profits becomes a different matter, thus conflict create. One of the most fundamental problems in integrative negotiation is that parties fail to recognize the integrative potential in a negotiation problem. Negotiators like Fontaine and Gaudin are too often assume that Reliant has the same objectives and goals as they do, and accordingly they fail to search for information about Reliant's hiding preferences and priorities.
Actually, opponents are primarily motivated to achieve outcomes that satisfy only their own needs at this case. To some extents, Relaint's negotiators also play well on manipulating the scheduling of negotiations. Hauptmann agreed on September 10 that it was also in Reliant's best interests to complete the contract negotiations as quickly as possible. He felt that there were only a few minor issues that remained to be discussed. Fontaine inquired as to what those issues were. Thus began 6 more months of delays.
From the Just-in-time management perspective, this tactic help Reliant gain lots of advantages for decision making and controlling. Furthermore, most of the negotiation scheduled to begin immediately after their arrival, when Pacific negotiators are still suffering from the fatigue of travel and jet lag. Meanwhile, they took advantage of delay tactics to squeeze the negotiation into the last remaining minutes of a session in order to extract concessions from the visiting party.
Fontaine and Gaudin should have realized that and have a good sense about the precarious of market situation, then try to find other alternative business partner and form an alliance with outsiders in order to take upper hand during the whole business transaction. Alternatively, setting their own schedule for this negotiation by reminding counterpart about their decision and deadline for the whole transaction be made, meanwhile using alternatives to hurry the process of negotiation.
In addition, On May 15 Gaudin reported to Fontaine that significant progress was being made and he expected that the remaining issues could be closed up in a few weeks. Then on May 27 Hauptmann introduced the next 'remaining issue'. One way to encourage settlement and have more effectively dealt with this continuing introduction of significant new issues here is to increase the costs of not reaching a negotiated agreement as a disruptive action to take initiative in negotiating processing.
They could simply inform Reliant if not reach agreement this time; they will start to consider other partner by emphasizing their advantage currently and benefits from collaborating with them instead of being lead by Reliant and passive solving the problems. As for further actions, Kelsey may take following factors into consideration and give them as suggestion to Fontaine. First, both of the additional resale clauses are somewhat contradict or breach agreed items on both sides at the right beginning of the contract which states that long-term contracts protect both parties against the fluctuations in supply and demand.
Neither has right to let the other side assume risks from market fluctuations. Therefore, adding the two clauses is somewhat unilateral or illegitimate. Second, as the Contract Management and Maintenance states at the end of the contract that the purchaser will not attempt to take advantage of fluctuations or aberrations in the spot market price to gain advantage and both parties agree to live up to the formula price, consequently, if this contradiction force Pacific to meet current market price, they can refer to commercial law or judicial or legislative decision finally by questing about the validity of the whole contract.